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THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CON-
TRACTUAL RELATIONS. By Ian R. Macneil. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 1980. Pp. xiii, 164. $12.95. 
Because modem contractual relations are "intimately intercon-
nected with a larger society of great complexity," they often involve 
an ongoing series of exchanges among several individuals or institu-
tions as well as "extremely complex specializations of labor and 
product" (p. 20). Rules designed to govern contracts of "short dura-
tion, involving limited personal interactions, and . . . easily mea-
sured objects of exchange" 1 are not well suited to these contractual 
relations. In The New Social Contract, Professor Ian Macneil 
sketches a concept of contract that promises freedom from the con-
ceptual limitations of traditional doctrine and applies that concept to 
modem contractual relations. 
Macneil's first chapter explores the nature of contract in an effort 
to produce a definition more descriptive of modem exchange. In 
sharp contrast to the Restatement's law-oriented definition,2 Macneil 
defines contract broadly as "the relations among parties to the pro-
cess of projecting exchange into the future" (p. 4). Macneil argues 
that exchange occurs along a spectrum of transactional and rela-
tional behavior.3 This spectrum covers the entire range of exchange 
relations - from the most isolated discrete transaction to the most 
complex ongoing contractual relationship. 
At one end of his spectrum, Macneil places "discrete transac-
tions" between two individuals, the principal subject of classical con-
tract law. Discrete transactions are characterized by careful 
measurement of what is exchanged, specification of time and manner 
of performance, comprehensive planning regarding the allocation of 
burdens and benefits, and little expectation of cooperation outside 
the scope of the exchange itself. At the other end of Macneil's spec-
I. I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS 12 (2d ed. 1978). 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ I (Tent. Draft 1973): "A contract is a prom-
ise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes a duty." 
3. Macneil has previously outlined his contractual spectrum. See I. MACNEIL, supra note 
I, at 12-16. 
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trum are contractual relations.4 Relational contracts, such as the 
UAW's agreement with General Motors, involve continuing ex-
change and interaction between the parties. The open-ended nature 
of contractual relations prevents detailed planning and necessitates 
cooperation and compromise regarding the incidence of contractual 
burdens and benefits. 
After laying out his contractual spectrum, Macneil identifies con-
tract norms that provide underlying principles for specific legal rules. 
Some norms apply largely to one end of the spectrum; others are 
common to both discrete transactions and contractual relations. 
Macneil's discussion of mutuality illustrates that the strength of these 
norms varies along the spectrum. According to Macneil, the mutual-
ity norm requires "mutual perception of benefit" and "calls not for 
equality . . . but for some kind of evenness" in the distribution of 
exchange surplus (p. 44). The law of discrete transactions, which 
views conflict of interest as the lifeblood of the bargaining process, 
generally will not alter contractual allocation of exchange surplus.5 
In contractual relations, however, the legal principles traditionally 
applied to discrete transactions "can prevail only so long as they suf-
ficiently avoid conflict with other normative principles" (p. 86). For 
this reason, societal pressures generate legal rules that tend to equal-
ize either bargaining power or the final distribution of exchange sur-
plus. 
To illustrate this point, Macneil explores the mutuality norm and 
the concept of power in employment relations law. Before the ad-
vent of collective bargaining, employers dominated discrete transac-
tions with individual employees and dictated employment terms. 
Because the "law has intervened in countless ways to enhance mutu-
ality and to change balances of power" (p. 87), the current picture is 
radically different. 
4. Macneil further subdivides contractual relations into "primitive" and "modem" catego• 
ries. He notes that, increasingly, "modem contractual relations are ridden with measurement 
and specificity," p. 22, but adds that "the modem contractual relation does not become simply 
a bunch of discrete transactions. . . . (A]ny modern relation also involves a great deal of 
exchange that cannot be or is not measured." P. 22. 
5. One commentator explains: 
The fundamental premise of economic individualism is that people will create and share 
out among themselves more wealth if the state refuses either to direct them to work or to 
force them to share. Given human nature and the limited effectiveness of legal interven• 
lion, the attempt to guarantee everyone a high level of welfare ... would require massive 
state interference in every aspect of human activity. . . . On the other hand, a regime 
which convincingly demonstrates that it will let people starve . . . before forcing others to 
help them will create the most powerful of incentives to production and exchange. 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1742 
(1976). 
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As the collective bargaining example suggests, modem exchange 
transactions are overwhelmingly relational. Beca:use neoclassical 
contract law lacks any "overriding relational foundation" (p. 72), 
Macneil argues that it cannot solve modern commercial problems. 
He points, for example, to the Uniform Commercial Code's infa-
mous "Battle-of-the-Forms" provision.6 U.C.C. Section 2-207 at-
tempts to conform the common-law mirror-image rule to the 
commercial reality that merchants conduct business even when the 
terms off er and acceptance do not match. Such transactions occur 
because general understandings may satisfy people who regularly do 
business with each other. Although relational concepts could help 
resolve the "Battle-of-the-Forms" situation, the UCC instead modi-
fies discrete transaction law without "building relational founda-
tions" (p. 74). 
The Supreme Court applied relational principles more success-
fully in a series of decisions limiting judicial review of labor arbitra-
tion awards.7 "The primacy of the arbitrator within a consensually 
limited jurisdiction" (p. 76) provided a relational base for these deci-
sions. This experience indicates that relational concepts can over-
come the discrete system's conceptual limitations. 
Macneil's final chapter addresses other problems of modern rela-
tional contract law in addition to mutuality and bargaining power. 
He discusses contractual solidarity, the impact of agents without 
principals, and the future of "Technical Man." In several places the 
discussion is 9bscure and largely speculative. For example, in the 
book's closing pages, Macneil predicts that society will eventually 
trade certainty and complexity of planning for a less centralized, 
"small is beautiful" economy. Macneil fails to relate this conclusion 
to his analytic framework, and he therefore leaves the reader some-
what unsatisfied. 
Despite his speculative conclusions, Macneil's contractual spec-
trum is comprehensive and analytically useful. However, his taxo-
nomic style makes for dense reading. A chart or table outlining the 
differences between discrete transactions and contractual relations 
would have been particularly helpful.8 Nevertheless, Macneil suc-
cessfully presents a paradigm that. facilitates meaningful analysis of 
6. u.c.c. § 2-207. 
7. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
8. Macneil has provided his students with such aids. See I. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 14-
15, 25. A chart or table could effectively aid the reader's understanding in a book of this 
length. 
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modem exchange transactions. The breadth of this subject and the 
constraints of limited space demanded that Macneil paint with a 
broad brush. Readers seeking exhaustive treatment of pressing con-
tracts problems must look elsewhere.9 But those who welcome a re-
freshing interdisciplinary10 approach to perennial topics should 
certainly read this book. 
9. See, e.g., Macneil, The Many Futures oJ Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 808-16 
(1974). 
10. Macneil draws extensively from Weber and Durkheim in his treatment of labor and 
exchange specialization. See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1964); 
M. WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947). He modestly notes, 
however, that his work has "yet to pay proper attention to legal history." P. 139 n.25. For a 
classic treatment of the early history of contract, see H. MAINE, ANCIENT LA w 295-354 
(1963); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 591-631 (1948). The most 
recent treatment of contract-law development in the last century is G. GILMORE, THE DEATH 
OF CONTRACT (1977). 
